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Chapter 20

Marriage and Finance
Jeffrey Dew

Abstract This chapter reviews interdisciplinary research concerning the association between marriage and personal finances. The first section of the chapter discusses financial practices within marriage and the financial differences between
married couples and other family types. The second section reviews the research
on the ability of financial factors to predict marital formation, satisfaction/conflict,
and dissolution. The chapter also suggests future research avenues.
Scholars have repeatedly noted the lack of information on how families handle
money. In her seminal work on meanings of money, Zelizer (1994, p. 43) wrote,
“In terms of evidence, to study money in the family is to enter largely uncharted
territory. . . . we know less about money matters than about family violence or even
marital sex.” A decade later, scholars are still calling for more research on how
families utilize their money (Daly, 2003; Israelsen & Hatch, 2005). The relationship between finances and marriage is actually reciprocal. That is, financial issues
predict marital processes and outcomes just as marriage predicts financial behavior.
Considering the many legal stipulations and social norms surrounding both marriage
and financial matters, it is not surprising that this relationship is bidirectional.
Understanding the reciprocal relationship between marriage and finances benefits
practitioners as well as theorists. Financial planners may benefit from understanding
how married couples’ financial needs differ from single individuals’ needs. The relationship between finances and marriage is also important for premarital educators
and marital therapists (Poduska & Allred, 1990) because couples seeking marital
therapy often have elevated levels of financial problems and conflicts over finances
(Aniol & Snyder, 1997). Finally, the relationship between marriage and finances
is relevant to policy. Welfare reform, passed in 1996 and reauthorized in 2006,
allows states to use federal money to encourage and strengthen marriage among
low-income individuals as an antipoverty strategy.
This chapter reviews recent, and some classic, research on the relationship
between marriage and finances from multiple disciplines. First, the meaning of
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marriage for financial behaviors is reviewed. Second, the ability of different financial
issues to predict marital formation, quality, and dissolution is evaluated. Suggestions
for future research are made throughout the review.

Marriage and Financial Practices
Financial Management in Marriage
Scholars know little about how marriage shapes financial practices. For the most
part, research has analyzed differences between married couples’ and single individuals’ financial behavior. For example, married couples are more likely than cohabiting couples to pool their income (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003), and married
couples also pool their savings (Fletschner & Klawitter, 2005). Further, married couples accumulate more assets and utilize consumer debt more than single individuals
do (Fan, 2000; Hao, 1996; Lupton & Smith, 2003). Interestingly, marriage has no
bearing on financial risk tolerance, although having children does negatively predict
financial risk tolerance (Chaulk, Johnson, & Bulcroft, 2003). Beyond these simple
descriptive differences, little is known about the meaning of marriage for financial
behaviors.
Many research questions regarding marriage and financial behaviors remain
unanswered. For example, scholars have only recently described income and asset
pooling among married couples. The reasons for pooling have yet to be investigated.
Scholars also do not know whether individuals consolidate their debt when they
marry, and the patterns of married couples’ joint debt assumption are unknown.
Research has also generally overlooked issues in family consumption—an activity that consumes much of family’s time (Daly, 2003). For example, cohabiting
parents spend more than married parents on alcohol and tobacco (DeLeire & Kalil,
2005), but other consumption differences are unknown. For example, what financial
instruments (e.g., cash, credit cards, etc.) do different family types tend to use to
make large purchases? How much information do married couples gather before
they make purchases? Additionally, few descriptions of marital status differences in
the uses of various investment instruments exist.
Beyond describing the differences in financial behavior between married couples and other families, the mechanisms that lead to these differences also need
uncovering. That is, research needs to investigate why married couples and single
individuals enact differing financial behaviors. Selection, the tendency for individuals with different characteristics to make different union choices, is likely to be
one explanation since individuals that are financially stable are more likely to marry
(Clarkberg, 1999; Oppenheimer, 2003; Xie, Raymo, Goyette, & Thornton, 2003).
Financially stable individuals may use their money differently from individuals who
financially struggle. Thus, differences in financial behaviors may already be in place
before individuals marry and may have nothing to do with the marriage itself.
Scholars have identified other reasons than selection for behavioral differences
between married and single individuals. Following marriage, both men and women
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reduce the frequency and intensity of risky behaviors (e.g., drinking) (Waite &
Gallagher, 2000). Thus, on average, the norms of marriage seem to elicit safe and
conventional behaviors in married individuals. Likewise, marriage may encourage
couples to utilizing their money more responsibly. Additionally, following marriage,
individuals have to balance using money to maximize their own well-being with the
well-being of the family. This may lead to different financial behaviors than the
individual would have engaged in before they were married. These mechanisms
(selection, conventionalization, etc.) need to be tested, though.

Income and Wealth Accumulation Differences
One area that has received a fair amount of attention is the income and wealth differences between married couples and others. Even though marriage is no longer
necessary to economically advance, married individuals are economically better off
than their single counterparts, on average (Waite & Gallagher, 2000). The mechanisms behind the financial advantage of marriage are only beginning to be examined.
Married couples generally have higher incomes than single individuals. Married
couples have the highest median income of all family forms and, with the exception
of single male households, have the highest per adult capita incomes (DeNavasWalt, Proctor, & Lee, 2006). Further, the likelihood that an individual will ever attain
an “affluent” income in their lifetime (e.g., 10 times the poverty level) is strongly
enhanced by marriage (Hirschl, Altobelli, & Rank, 2003). Additionally, only 5 %
of married couples live below the poverty line when compared with 28 % of single
women and 13 % of single men (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2006). Beyond income-based
definitions of poverty, marriage also decreases other types of economic hardships,
even among low-income individuals (Lerman, 2002).
Scholars have put forth many explanations for the income advantage of marriage.
Married couples often have access to two incomes, whereas noncohabiting singles
have only one income (Greenwood, Guner, & Knowles, 2003). Married couples also
benefit from economies of scale where two individuals can live with fewer expenses
if they live together instead of apart. Individuals with better earnings/earnings potential also marry more than individuals with poorer economic prospects (Clarkberg,
1999; Oppenheimer, 2003; Xie et al., 2003). Very little research has analyzed
whether these factors account for the income differences between married couples
and single individuals, though.
Marriage and wealth also relate. In cross-sectional estimates, married couples
have more assets than single, divorced, or cohabiting individuals (Waite & Gallagher,
2000). Further, married couples accumulate more assets over time, on average (Hao,
1996; Zagorsky, 2003a). Divorce devastates adults’ financial net-worth, but remarriage often makes up the lost wealth (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2003b).
The same mechanisms that explain the income advantage for married couples
(two-earners, economies of scale, specialization) are also frequently cited in bringing about the asset advantage. Interestingly, although cohabiting couples have many
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of the same advantages as married couples have, union duration does not predict
asset accumulation for cohabiting couples, whereas union duration and assets are
positively related for married couples (Hao, 1996). Further, longitudinal data shows
that per person, married individuals accumulate 77 % more assets annually than single individuals (Zagorsky, 2003b). Consequently, marriage likely enables couples to
accumulate assets for reasons other than simply having two earners and benefiting
from economies of scale.
Selection is one explanation for married couples’ wealth advantages. Due to
social norms (Smock, Manning, & Porter, 2005), the type of union that couples
choose is often related to the economic characteristics of the partners. Individuals
with stable economic characteristics tend to marry each other, whereas economically
disadvantaged individuals will cohabit and delay marriage until they have attained a
measure of economic stability (Oppenheimer, 2003; Smock et al., 2005). Although
selection may produce wealth differences, married couples still have considerably
more assets (and save at higher rates) than other families even after statistically
controlling for economic factors and for the number of earners in the home (Lupton
& Smith, 2003; Schmidt & Sevak, 2006).
Other explanations may account for the wealth differences that exist between
family types. Marriage entails social norms of permanence and public expressions
of commitment that may increase trust and allow married couples to feel more comfortable investing in their marriage (Cherlin, 2004; Pollak, 1985). Support for this
notion of marriage conferring a higher level of trust than cohabitation is the fact that
married couples are far more likely than cohabiting couples to pool their incomes
(Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003). Income pooling allows couples to live less expensive because of economies of scale. By pooling financial assets, married couples
will also have access to more interest income than they would if they held their
assets separately. Further, if marriage allows individuals to trust their partner more
than other types of unions, it would allow spouses to acquire investment properties
(homes, real estate) with less risk. Relatedly, trust allows couples to hold volatile
(yet profitable) investments for a long time period thus mitigating some market risk.
Interestingly, young married individuals do not have more wealth than unmarried individuals, perhaps indicating that the marital advantage of wealth takes many years
to materialize (Schmidt & Sevak, 2006).
Social norms surrounding marriage may also encourage wealth accumulation.
As noted above, marriage may “conventionalize” individuals so that they may feel
obligated to save and invest some of their income instead of using it all. Further,
the “marital script” also explicitly includes financial investments such as home buying, saving for children’s college funds, and retirement (Townsend, 2002; Waite
& Gallagher, 2000). All of these investments require decades of regular financial
inputs. Consequently, marriage—with its norms of lifelong commitment—is ideally
suited to achieving these financial goals.
Another explanation for wealth differences is that married couples receive greater
social (e.g., economic) support than cohabiting couples or other types of families.
By definition, a married individual has access to the resources of more kin than singles have. Further, married couples with children receive more economic transfers
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from their families than cohabiting couples and single mothers, and these transfers
positively predict wealth levels (Hao, 1996). Interestingly, when the analysis is restricted to young adults, married couples and cohabiting couples do not differ on
likelihood of receiving financial transfers from family (Eggebeen, 2005). It may be
that marital childbearing may elicit more financial support from families than simply
just marrying. At any rate, these higher levels of transfers to married couples with
children may partially account for the wealth advantage of married couples.
Prospective longitudinal studies would provide better tests of the mechanisms
that link income, wealth, and marriage. Prospective studies would assess individuals’ wealth and income before and after marital unions. Thus, for example, evidence
of economic differences between individuals that precede union formation might
help settle questions of whether marriage influences financial behavior or whether
financial differences exist prior to marriage.

Marriage, Gender, and Control of Money
Marriage often changes an individual’s relationship with money. Whereas before
marriage an individual is in full control of his or her money, following marriage
income has to be allocated among various family members (Lundberg & Pollak,
1996). Neoclassical economic models assume that marriages are single economic
units with all members acting to maximize the utility of the unit (Blau, Ferber,
& Winkler, 2001). Neoclassical economic theory further assumes that this maximization occurs without any problems “either because there is a consensus on
preferences within the family or because decisions are made by an altruistic family
head and accepted by all other members.” (Blau et al., 2001, p. 49). Although most
married couples pool their finances, in line with the unitary view of neoclassical economic theory, recent research has questioned the other basic neoclassical economic
assumptions.
First, recent studies have challenged the ideas of common preferences in marriage. If wives and husbands shared preferences regarding consumption and savings
behaviors, marital arguments regarding money would not arise. However, finances
continue to be problematic for some couples (Amato & Rogers, 1997; Aniol &
Snyder, 1997; Schramm, Marshall, Harris, & Lee, 2005; Zagorsky, 2003a). Further,
when wives control the finances, expenditures on women’s and children’s goods
increases and child well-being increases (Lundberg & Pollak, 1996; Thomas, 1990).
These differences should not occur under the common preference model.
Historical analyses have also thrown much doubt on the idea of husbands serving
as an altruistic family head. Primary historical sources show that even as recently
as the 1930s, husbands certainly were not altruistic heads nor were many wives
happy with the husbands’ distribution of their husbands wage. In the early twentieth
century, wives had to beg their husbands to share his wages so that she could have
adequate funds to run the home (Zelizer, 1994). Some wives had to resort to “sexual
blackmail” or “stealing from their husbands” when he gave her less than was needed
to run the home.
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Finally, women and men may not even view finances the same way. In nationally representative longitudinal samples, husbands and wives differed on their estimates of family income, assets, and debt (Zagorsky, 2003a). Husbands reported
more income and assets than wives did, whereas wives reported more debts. These
differences were significant. For example, 50 % of the spouses reported a 35 % or
greater difference in their assets. If husbands and wives do not even have a shared
understanding of their current finances, it is unlikely that they will be able to have
common preferences on the allocation of their income and wealth.
Despite the proliferation of theoretical models that allow husbands and wives
to have their own preferences and to negotiate over the intrahousehold allocations
of resources (see Lundberg & Pollak, 1996, for a review), few recent studies have
analyzed how husbands and wives actually distribute and manage money within the
home. The topic of marital financial management and decision making enjoyed a
vogue during the 1970s and 1980s among financial planners and gender scholars
(e.g., Blumstein & Schwartz, 1984; Davis, 1976; Spiro, 1983). Recent research on
the how couples communicate about, and manage financial issues and decisions
is rarer, though exceptions do exist. In an investigation of marital power, for example, one study showed that the higher the share of the total family income that
wives’ contributed, the more involved they were in managing the families’ finances
(Bernasek & Bajtelsmit, 2002). Another recent study investigated interaction behavior between wives and husbands as they tried to persuade each other in different
purchasing situations (Su, Fern, & Ye, 2003).
The intersection between gender, marriage, and finances merits more scholarly
attention. Research could consider how social norms of gender and marriage influence husbands’ and wives’ financial behaviors and feelings of power within the
marriage. An interesting example is an analysis of the conditions that lead to different portfolio profiles in wives’ defined contribution plans. Wives whose husbands
are less educated, older, or earn less than they do tend to have less risky (and hence
less profitable) portfolios, whereas wives’ characteristics do not predict husbands’
investment strategies (Lyons & Yilmazer, 2004). Considerable work also remains
to be done by communication researchers and financial planners, on the ways that
husbands and wives work together (or separately) to manage financial issues. Particularly needed to advance this area of research is income, savings, and consumption
data that is measured on the spouse level and that is combined with marital data such
as gender role identities and couples’ feelings of fairness in handling the finances.

Financial Considerations in Marital Processes and Outcomes
Not only does marriage predict individuals’ financial practices but recent research
also affirms that individuals’ financial practices predict various aspects of marriage
including marital formation, marital satisfaction and quality, marital distress, and
divorce. Though these relationships are widely believed to exist, some scholars have
asserted that they are untested (Andersen, 2005; Kerkmann, Lee, Lown, & Allgood,
2000). Examining the literature across disciplines, however, shows that empirical
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studies have tested the associations between finances and marital outcomes, and
that finances do indeed predict marriage outcomes.

Finances and Union Formation
Interestingly, a paradox emerges when finances and the likelihood of marriage are
considered. On the one hand, marriage is no longer economically necessary, whereas
in the not-to-distant past marriage increased the likelihood of economic survival for
both men and women. This change has especially influenced women; increasing job
opportunities for women have made remaining single economically feasible. The
ability for women to support themselves following a divorce has also increased over
the past 30 years (McKeever & Wolfinger, 2001). Based on this shift, one would
suspect a decline in the relationship between economic stability and the likelihood of
marriage. With only one exception (Sassler & Goldscheider, 2004), though, recent
research shows that financial considerations are still quite relevant to the decision to
marry.
Economic factors are certainly not the only consideration the decision to marry
but they are important and seem to govern the timing of marriage. Marriage, because
of its increasing decline, has become a symbol of “status that one builds up to”,
the “capstone of adult personal life” rather than the “foundation” (Cherlin, 2004,
p. 855). The social norms surrounding marriage thus specify that individuals and
couples should be economically stable before marriage (Cherlin, 2004; Smock et al.,
2005). The economic stability/potential of a prospective partner is difficult for young
adults to assess, however, and individuals will postpone marriage when they are
uncertain about the economic viability of their union (Oppenheimer, 1988).
Recent studies have linked economic uncertainty and marital timing. Men’s
earnings, employment status, occupational potential, and education are positively
associated with marital formation and negatively associated with age at marriage
(Clarkberg, 1999; Oppenheimer, 2003; Smock & Manning, 1997; Xie et al., 2003).
Further, individuals with less financial stability use cohabitation as a union strategy until they achieve desired levels of financial stability so they can marry (Oppenheimer, 2003; Smock & Manning, 1997). Interestingly, even though men have
begun to value prospective wives’ earning capabilities more (Buss, Shackelford,
Kirkpatrick, & Larsen, 2001), women’s earning capabilities have not been shown
to make a difference in the transition to marriage. Thus, marriage formation is
still strongly associated with men’s economic well-being. Male economic stability
seems to signal that a marriage will be economically secure and afford a measure of
prosperity (Edin, 2001; Oppenheimer, 2003).
Despite the extensive literature that links economic stability to union formation,
many questions remain unanswered. For example, research has not really gone
beyond education, employment, and earnings to determine whether other financial issues serve as signals of economic stability and influence marital timing. For
example, assets, consumer debt, and student debt during early adulthood may influence marital timing and union formation (Dew, 2007b).
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Further, research has not examined whether individuals evaluate potential spouses’
ability to manage the money that they earn. Although the ability to procure money
is important, the ability to manage that money is equally important for financial
and marital stability. For example, marital arguments over finances and/or divorce
often results when one spouse perceives that the other spouse is mishandling money
(Amato & Rogers, 1997; Aniol & Snyder, 1997). Studies have not shown whether
individuals evaluate a potential spouse’s ability to manage money, however.

Finances and Marital Quality
Scholars have also analyzed how different financial aspects of marriage relate to
couples’ marital experiences. For example, scholars have long recognized that economic pressure may add to couples’ marital distress. The family stress model of
economic pressure and marital distress shows that negative economic events, such
as not being able to pay bills, losing a job, or cutting back in consumption are associated with increases in spouses’ negative affective states (Conger, Ge, & Lorenz,
1994). Increases in depression and hostility are then linked to negative marital behaviors such as arguments, withdrawal of spousal support, and discussions of divorce (Conger, Rueter, & Elder, 1999; Vinokur, Price, & Caplan, 1996). Researchers
have tested the family stress model using longitudinal data and multiple methods,
across cultures, and in nationally representative samples (U.S.) and have shown that
it is a good model of the links between nonnormative economic stressors and marital
distress (Conger et al., 1990; Dew, 2007a; Kinnunen & Pulkkinen, 1998; Kwon,
Rueter, Lee, Koh, & Ok, 2003).
Moving away from nonnormative economic stressors, researchers have begun to
analyze how “mundane” financial issues such as savings behaviors, the use of consumer debt, and money management behaviors relate to reports of marital quality.
These studies have found that the mechanisms that allow financial issues to predict
marital quality extend beyond feelings of economic pressure. For example, married
couples’ consumer debt predicts changes in marital conflict even after controlling
for the elements of the family stress model (Dew, 2007a). Additionally, married
couples that share financial decision-making power are more satisfied than couples
who do not share the decision-making power, and married couples are more likely
to be dissatisfied when they do not pool their finances (Kurdek, 1991; Schaninger
& Buss, 1986). Much work remains to be done in studying the relationship between
“everyday” financial behaviors and couples marital quality.
Because financial needs change over time (Baek & Hong, 2004; Xiao, 1996),
research has also examined how financial issues might relate to marriage at different
points in the life course. Not surprisingly, financial need and anxiety has been found
to be greatest in early adulthood (Drentea, 2000; Mirowsky & Ross, 1999). Further,
recently married couples report that consumer debt and changes in consumer debt
are associated with problems such as declines in marital satisfaction (Dew, 2008;
Schramm et al., 2005). Also, when recently married couples perceive that they
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manage money effectively, they are more satisfied with their marriage (Kerkmann
et al., 2000).
Interestingly, by the time that couples retire, few financial issues are related
to marital distress. In a qualitative analysis, only 11 % of retirement-aged couples indicated that financial issues were problematic (Henry, Miller, & Giarrusso,
2005). Further, although financial issues such as mortgage debt, consumer debt, and
income-to-needs ratios indirectly predict couples’ marital distress, they do not seem
to matter for couples that have been retired for many years (Dew, 2006). Given
the impending retirement of the large “baby boom” cohort, further studies of how
financial issues relate to marriage are relevant. Such studies would be especially
pertinent since some researchers have claimed that much of the baby boom cohort
has not saved enough for retirement and has more mortgage debt than any previous
cohort (Kutza, 2005; Masnick, Di, & Belsky, 2005).
Future research into the relationship between finances and marital quality might
profitably examine the links between individual spouse’s characteristics, marital dynamics, and broader contextual issues (e.g., local economies). Couples’ finances and
their marital quality are subject to the influence of forces from these three areas. An
example of research that blends two of these three areas is a study that showed that individual spouses’ materialism predicts perceptions of economic difficulties which are
associated with decreased marital satisfaction (Dean, Carroll, & Yang, 2007). Interestingly, spouses’ materialism predicts perceptions of economic difficulties more than
household income. Studies that blend variables from multiple areas have the potential
to increase understanding of the relationship between finances and marital quality.

Finances and Divorce
Since financial issues predict both marital formation and quality, it is not surprising
that they also been linked to marital dissolution. Two major topics within this area
are the association between assets and divorce and the relationship between financial
disagreements and divorce.
Scholars have known about the negative association between financial assets and
divorce for decades (Levinger, 1965; Locke, 1951). Assets are such a strong predictor
of future divorce that they reduce the relationship between income and divorce to
nonsignificance (Dew, 2005; Galligan & Bahr, 1978). Only one study has failed to find
a relationship between financial assets and future divorce. This study simultaneously
considered assets and various relationship dynamics as predictors of divorce. Assets
did not predict divorce with relationship dynamics in the model (Sanchez & Gager,
2000). This study provides interesting clues to the mechanisms that may explain the
relationship between assets and divorce. In an interesting twist, one recent study found
that assets negatively predict divorce except for husbands and wives who earn the
same amount and have poor marital quality (Finke & Pierce, 2006). These scholars
asserted that these couples who know they are about to divorce start to accumulate
assets so that they will have a higher standard of living following the divorce.
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Scholars have offered many theories to explain this relationship. In social exchange theory, assets may be an attraction to the marriage. That is, assets may
enhance individuals’ experience of marriage, may increase marital satisfaction, and
may make divorce less likely (Levinger, 1976). Commitment theorists assert that
assets are barriers to divorce rather than attraction to the marriage. These theorists
argue that assets can keep spouses together who would otherwise divorce because
they do not want to split their assets and live at a lower standard of living (Booth,
Johnson, White, & Edwards, 1986; Johnson, 1991; Johnson, Caughlin, & Huston,
1999). In other words, assets raise the cost of divorce. Scholars are just beginning
to test these explanatory mechanisms against each other, and to extend the literature
by testing whether the association between assets and divorce differs by gender, and
whether the relationship is spurious (Dew, 2005).
Another way that financial issues purportedly relate to divorce is through spouses’
disagreements about family finances. Studies that examine married couples prospectively (e.g., prior to the divorce) find that disagreements over finances strongly predict of divorce. Prospective longitudinal data from both convenience samples and
nationally representative samples show that variables such as arguing over finances,
or feeling that one’s spouse handles money foolishly, predicts future divorce—
sometimes even predicting divorce 15 years later (Amato & Rogers, 1997; TerlingWatt, 2001). In these studies, financial disagreements more than doubled the likelihood that a couple would divorce (Amato & Rogers, 1997). Only extramarital
affairs and drug/alcohol abuse more strongly predicted divorce than financial disagreements do, and financial disagreements are one of the few predictors of divorce
that applied to both husbands and wives (Amato & Rogers, 1997; Terling-Watt,
2001). Further, when spouses feel that financial decision-making power is shared
equally, and when they have a similar view of their finances, the likelihood of divorce declines (Schaninger & Buss, 1986; Zagorsky, 2003a).
Both marriage and consumer finance practitioners might benefit from continued
research in this area. Aniol and Snyder’s (1997) study showed that couples who seek
financial counseling often have elevated levels of marital problems and vice versa.
It might be interesting to design treatment studies and evaluate whether financial
counseling has a side-benefit of improving marriage. Research has shown that financially troubled couples who implemented their financial counselors’ advice report improvements in their health (O’Neill, Sorhaindo, Xiao, & Garman, 2005), and
filing bankruptcy helped some couples avoid divorce in a qualitative study (Thorne,
2001). These findings suggest that couples who receive financial counseling may
experience improvements in their marriage and avoid divorce.

Conclusion
Although Zelizer’s (1994) assertion—that scholars have very little evidence of a
relationship between marriage and finances—is less true now, this reciprocal relationship still merits considerable research. This review has shown that the vantage
points of many disciplines help contribute to this undertaking. Practitioners that deal
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with the relationship between financial behavior and marital issues are underrepresented in this area of research. Including their unique perspectives would benefit
scholars’ understanding. Further, a more detailed understanding of married couples’
financial practices is needed. For example, married couples’ consumption, pooling,
and current details of their decision-making processes are warranted. Another research area that needs strengthening is investigating the mechanisms behind family
structure differences and financial well-being. Finally, understanding the relationship between individual spouses’ attitudes and histories, couples’ marriages, and the
contexts in which their marriages are situated would greatly add to the literature. To
accomplish these goals, new types of data are needed that blend detailed financial
behavior and attitude questions with items on spouses’ marital history and quality.
As researchers more thoroughly test how marriages and finances relate, practitioners and scholars will be better equipped to understand an issue central to married
couples’ daily lives.
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